In view of the lack of high-end and highperformance products in China's new energy automobile industry, the evolutionary game model of the core technology breakthrough of the new energy automobile industry is constructed, the behavioral strategies of multi-agent participation are analyzed, and the conditions of the system's progressive stability are discussed to realize the system's Tired balance. The research results show that the key to realizing the breakthrough of core technology in new energy automobile enterprises lies in the degree of government incentives, the additional cost of enterprise investment, the current opportunity loss of enterprises, and the innovation cost invested by academic institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a key area of "Made in China 2025" and a strategic consideration for economic development, the development of new energy vehicles is in full swing and the record is commendable. Although it has a good foundation for industrial development, common technology has also made significant progress, but the key core technologies have not yet been fully mastered [1] [2] [3] , such as battery, motor and electronic control system technology has always been Siemens, Bosch, Delphi and other foreign countries. Controlled by the auto giants, the product level is not high [4] [5] [6] , which restricts the development of China's new energy auto industry.
There are many factors influencing the breakthrough of core technologies in the new energy automobile industry, involving the external environment, the behavior of internal entities, and interest relations. The new energy automobile industry involves multi-party cooperation, which is essentially a process of interest formation and redistribution among multiple entities. . However, different types of subjects are driven by the acceptance of economic thinking, and their interests are different. There are corresponding differences in their respective strategies. In this context, new energy vehicles must resolutely take high-tech, high-quality, high-brand routes in order to seize a new round of commanding heights and firmly grasp the right to speak.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL CONSTRUCTION
Industry-university-research cooperation is an inevitable way and choice for emerging industries to break through the industrial bottleneck and enhance their knowledge innovation capabilities. The basis of technological breakthroughs in the new energy automobile industry is the cooperation and innovation under the participation of multi-agents. The cooperation between multi-agents such as academic research institutions and new energy vehicles is of paramount importance. This paper selects new energy auto companies and academic research institutions as the main players. It assumes that both parties are bounded and rational, and pursues the maximization of self-interest as the fundamental goal. In this process, the subjects treat the expected returns with risk aversion; The incentives for enterprises and institutions to actively cooperate are: 1 G , 2 G , and the strategic choices of the two sides are new energy companies (cooperation, noncooperation) and academic research institutions (cooperation, non-cooperation).
A. profit and Loss Variable Setting
(1) Profit and loss variables of new energy automobile companies 1  : The company has not adopted the basic benefits of the cooperation strategy using the general technology model; 1   : The company actively adopts a cooperative strategy to achieve the marginal benefits obtained by the breakthrough of core technology, that is, increase the direct income brought by the market share of the brand; :The additional cost when the company actively cooperates mainly refers to the innovation cost when the enterprise adopts the cooperation strategy, such as the increase of R&D investment; 1 S : Loss of opportunity when the company does not adopt the cooperation strategy. As the market competition becomes more and more fierce, the society's awareness of technological innovation continues to increase, and the market returns brought by other enterprises' technological breakthroughs make their profits unable to maintain the original basic income level. In comparison, there will be a reduction in opportunity resulting in a decrease. 
B. Revenue Matrix Construction
Based on the above basic assumptions and the setting of profit and loss variables, the income matrix of new energy auto companies and academic institutions is shown in Table Ⅰ .
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

A. A. Revenue Expectation Function Construction
According to the income matrix of Table Ⅰ , the expected returns of new energy auto companies and academic institutions are as follows:
(1) Expected benefits of enterprises
The expected return of the enterprise cooperation is 11 U , The expected return of non-cooperation is 12 U , then the average expected return is
, where:
The expected return of the enterprise cooperation is 21 U , The expected return of the enterprise non-cooperation is 22 U , then the average expected return of the enterprise is
The dynamic replication equation for the selection strategy of new energy auto companies is:
The dynamic replication equation for the research institute to select the cooperation strategy is:
B. Evolutionary Stability Strategy
In order to solve the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game, let:
It is easy to know that the above solutions constitute the boundary of the evolutionary game is
, in addition to the following equilibrium solutions:
Solve the above formula and get:
For the evolution of the two groups of new energy auto companies and academic institutions, they can be described by two differential equations (6) and (7), but which equilibrium point tends to be directly judged in the dynamic process. The local stability of the system at these equilibrium points is qualitatively analyzed below based on the Jacobian matrix.
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From the above analysis, it is clear that there are four special equilibrium points in the system:
The following is an example to discuss the condition that the system satisfies the progressive stability.
It is easy to know that the Jacobian matrix of the system at (1,1) is:
The characteristic value at this time is:
If both are satisfied
, then the three eigenvalues are all negative, which is progressively stable. The same is true for the asymptotic stability at the other three equilibrium points (Table Ⅱ) .
The inverse induction method is used to discuss the influence of each parameter on the tripartite behavior strategy.
(1) When
It is easy to know that the probability of an enterprise's active cooperation is positively related to the innovation input cost of the research institute; it is inversely proportional to the government's cooperation incentives with the research institute. At this point, it indicates that the research institutes have increased the intensity of innovation investment, which can effectively increase the breakthrough of core technology breakthroughs. 
It is easy to get the probability that the research institutes choose to cooperate actively. It is directly proportional to the investment in technology research and development of new energy auto companies; it is inversely proportional to the potential losses of enterprises and the incentives of the government to enterprises. At this point, it indicates that the company's investment in technology research and development can effectively promote cooperation between industry, university and research institutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
China's new energy vehicles are developing rapidly, but they still face a series of problems. For example, the core components of independent research and development are missing, and the core technologies have not yet been completely broken. In view of this, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the behaviors of new energy auto companies and academic institutions, which is essentially a strategic interaction between the two sides, forming a scientific and effective regulation mechanism, and promoting the core with the ultimate evolutionary stability strategy. Technical breakthroughs, from the above analysis, we can see that the government's incentive level, the additional cost of enterprise investment, the current opportunity loss of enterprises, and the innovation cost invested by academic institutions are important factors affecting the balance of interests. In order to break through the core technology of new energy vehicles and seize a new round of commanding heights, so that China truly becomes a globally competitive global auto power, the following specific measures can be taken:
(1) The government must accurately position its role and encourage innovation capacity building. On the one hand, the government should do a top-level design plan, increase incentives for new energy auto companies and academic institutions through overall planning and design, and reduce the cost, risk and uncertainty of R&D. On the other hand, it encourages science and technology innovation enterprises to actively enter the new energy automobile industry, realize cross-border innovation, exert the "squid" effect, stimulate industry innovation power, and build and utilize an open shared public technology platform.
(2)Scientifically formulate technical standards. To build a platform for national industry technology assessment and intellectual property protection under the leadership of the government, encourage technology to participate in shares, and build a community of destiny for industry, academia and research. To this end, the government should strengthen its technical testing capabilities and enhance the competitiveness and impact of China's new energy vehicle technology standards system. force.
(3)Strengthen investment in technology research and development and strengthen the innovation capability of key technologies. Technology is the foundation of the brand. Enterprises must attach great importance to the importance of core technology. Once the core technology cannot be controlled independently, the bitter fruit of future sanctions will be difficult to swallow. Enterprises should set up special research institutions, strengthen cooperation between industry, academia and research, increase investment in technology research and development, seize the commanding heights of high and new technology, and master their own core technologies.
